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Abstract. We investigate the following “epistemic” extensions of (frag-
ments of) first order logics: if ϕ is a formula, then iϕ is also a formula,
where I is a fixed finite set. The intended meaning of iϕ is “the ith
agent (ith participant of the model) knows ϕ”. The main result of the
paper is Theorem 1: if L is such a fragment of first order logic whose
consequence relation is weakly decidable, then the consequence relation
of the epistemic extension of L remains weakly decidable, as well.
1 Introduction
Definition 1. Let L be a fragment of first order logic and let I be any finite set.
The set EL of elementary epistemic formulas over L is defined to be the smallest
set satisfying the following two stipulations:
• EL contains all formulas of L and
• for any i ∈ I and ϕ ∈ EL we have iϕ ∈ FormE,I(L) (that is, EL is closed
for the operations i, for any i ∈ I).
In addition, FormE,I(L) is defined to be the set of all Boolean combinations of
EL.
The intended meaning of iϕ is “the ith agent (ith participant of the model)
knows ϕ”, where ϕ is a formula that may also contain j operations.
Logics of epistemology has been studied intensively, for related investigations
we refer to [1], [2] and the references therein.
Our main aim is to provide semantics for the formulas FormE,I(L) in such a
way, that the consequence relation of our semantics remains decidable, whenever
the consequence relation of L is decidable. For a quite expressive fragment of
first order logic with (weakly) decidable consequence relation, we refer to [3].
To achieve our goal, we need further preparations. In Section 2 we are sum-
ming up the preliminaries and definitions we need, in Section 3 we present the
proofs.
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2 Technical Introduction
Our notation is standard, however, the following short list may help the reader.
ThroughoutN denotes the set of natural numbers. Let L be a logic. Then FormL
and |=L denote respectively, the set of formulas of L and the consequence relation
of L (as usual, |=L also denotes the satisfaction relation of L). If A is a model
for L then Th(A) denotes the theory of A which is defined to be
Th(A) = {ϕ ∈ FormL : A |=L ϕ}.
Throughout, by Go¨del numbering we mean an injective function
g : FormE,I(L)→ N
such that both g and g−1 is computable. It is well known, that such a g func-
tion exists (in fact, there exists a primitive recursive such g with g−1 primitive
recursive, as well). We do not specify g further, because below we will use the
fact only, that such a g exists (and we do not use the particular form, or further
properties of such a g).
Definition 2. Let ϕ ∈ FormE,I(L). Then the tautological skeleton taut(ϕ) is
defined inductively as follows.
if ϕ is a formula of L, then taut(ϕ) = ϕ;
taut(¬ψ) = ¬taut(ψ);
taut(ψ ∧ %) = taut(ψ) ∧ taut(%);
taut(iψ) = Zn where Zn is the nth propositional variable and n is the
Go¨del-number of iψ.
In addition, if X ⊆ FormE,I(L), then taut(X) is defined to be
taut(X) = {taut(ϕ) : ϕ ∈ X}.
Remark 1. It is easy to see, that taut is a computable function, that is, there
exists an algorithm computing taut(ϕ) from ϕ. Moreover, ϕ is also computable
from taut(ϕ), because each propositional variable Zn corresponds at most one
formula ψ ∈ FormE,I(L), namely, Zn corresponds to that ψ (if any) whose Go¨del
number is n.
Definition 3. Let X ⊆ FormE,I(L) and let i ∈ I be fixed. Then cli(X) is
defined to be
cli(X) = {ϕ,iϕ : taut(X) |=L taut(ϕ)}.
Definition 4. By an 〈E , I〉-structure we mean a pair 〈A, f〉 where A is an L-
structure and f : I → P(FormE,I(L)) is a function, such that for any i ∈ I
• If ϕ ∈ FormL and A |=L ϕ then ϕ ∈ f(i);
• cli(f(i)) = f(i).
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Definition 5. Let 〈A, f〉 be an 〈E , I〉-structure and let k be an evaluation over
A. Then the satisfaction relation 〈A, f〉 |=E,L ϕ[k] is defined recursively on the
complexity of ϕ ∈ FormE,I(L) as follows.
• for an atomic (first order) formula 〈A, f〉 |=E,L ϕ[k] iff A |= ϕ[k];
• 〈A, f〉 |=E,L ¬ϕ[k] iff 〈A, f〉 6|=E,L ϕ[k];
• 〈A, f〉 |=E,L ϕ ∧ ψ[k] iff 〈A, f〉 |=E,L ϕ[k] and 〈A, f〉 |=E,L ψ[k];
• 〈A, f〉 |=E,L ∃vnϕ[k] iff there exists an evaluation k′ such that 〈A, f〉 |=E,L
ϕ[k′] and for any m 6= n we have k(m) = k′(m);
• 〈A, f〉 |=E,L iϕ[k] iff ϕ ∈ f(i).
Finally, 〈A, f〉 |=E,L ϕ iff 〈A, f〉 |=E,L ϕ[k] for any evaluation k over A.
Using the notation of the previous definition, it is easy to see, that for a
first order formula ϕ ∈ Form(L) the assertion 〈A, f〉 |=E,L ϕ is equivalent with
A |= ϕ.
Definition 6. Let Σ ⊆ FormE,I(L) and let ϕ ∈ FormE,I(L). Then Σ |=E,L ϕ
iff for any 〈E , I〉-structure 〈A, f〉 the following holds:
if for all ψ ∈ Σ we have 〈A, f〉 |=E,L ψ then 〈A, f〉 |=E,L ϕ.
We say, that the consequence relation of a logic L is weakly decidable iff there
exists an algorithm pi whose input is a finite set Σ ⊆ Form(L) and a formula
ϕ ∈ Form(L) and pi always stops after a finite number of steps and provides a
correct answer for the question “Σ
?|=L ϕ”.
Our main result is as follows.
Theorem 1. Suppose the consequence relation |=L of L is weakly decidable.
Then |=E,L is also weakly decidable.
The rest of this paper is devoted to prove this theorem. To do so, we need
further preparations.
3 Proofs
Lemma 1. Assume, that the consequence relation |=L of L is decidable. Let
X ⊆ FormE,I(L) be a decidable subset of FormE,I(L) and let i ∈ I be fixed.
Then cli(X) is a decidable subset of FormE,I(L).
Proof. Clearly, if X is decidable, then so is taut(X) (because by Remark 1,
taut−1 is computable and X is assumed to be decidable). Combining this with
the assumption, that the consequence relation |=L of L is decidable, the state-
ment follows immediately.
Now we will define a relation Ded and show, that this relation is decidable.
Finally, we show, that Ded and the consequence relation |=E,L coincide, thus
the algorithm deciding Ded also witnesses, that the consequence relation |=E,L
is weakly decidable.
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Definition 7. Let X ⊆ FormE,I(L) and let ϕ ∈ FormE,I(L). Then
Ded0(X) = {ψ ∈ FormL : X ∩ FormL |=L ψ}.
Now suppose, that Dedn has already been defined for some n ∈ N. Then Dedn+1(X)
is defined by recursion as follows.
Dedn(X) ⊆ Dedn+1(X);
if ϕ = iψ then ϕ ∈ Dedn+1(X) iff ψ ∈ cli(Dedn(X));
if ϕ = ¬ψ then ϕ ∈ Dedn+1(X) iff ψ 6∈ Dedn+1(X);






Theorem 2. Assume, that the consequence relation |=L of L is weakly decid-
able. Let X ⊆ FormE,I(L) be a finite subset of FormE,I(L). Then Ded(X) is a
decidable subset of FormE,I(L).
Proof. A simple inspection of Definition 7 together with Lemma 1 shows, that
Dedn(X) is decidable for all n ∈ N, in addition, (the Go¨del number of) an
algorithm deciding Dedn(X) may be computed from n. Moreover, ϕ ∈ Ded(X)
iff ϕ ∈ Dedn(X), where n is the number of all occurrences of -operations in ϕ.
It follows, that Ded(X) is decidable, as desired.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1. We will split the proof into two parts.
Theorem 3. Assume, that the consequence relation |=L of L is weakly decidable.
Let X ⊆ FormE,I(L) be a finite subset of FormE,I(L) and let ϕ ∈ FormE,I(L).
Then
ϕ ∈ Ded(X) implies X |=E,L ϕ.
Proof. Suppose ϕ ∈ Ded(X). Then there exists n ∈ N such that ϕ ∈ Dedn(X).
So it is enough to show
(∗) ϕ ∈ Dedn(X) implies X |=E,L ϕ and
〈A, f〉 |= X impies (∀i ∈ I)Dedn(X) ⊆ f(i).
We apply induction on n. If n = 0, then (∗) holds, obviously. Now assume,
that (∗) holds for 0, ..., n; we shall show, that it remains true for n + 1. To do
so, let ϕ ∈ Dedn+1(X).
If ϕ ∈ FormL then, in fact, ϕ ∈ Ded0(X), hence (∗) follows for ϕ from the
n = 0 case.
If ϕ = iψ, then, according to Definition 7, we have ψ ∈ cli(Dedn(X)). By
induction, we have X |=E,L Dedn(X). Assume 〈A, f〉 |=E,L X. It follows, that
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〈A, f〉 |=E,L Dedn(X). So, again by induction, we have Dedn(X) ⊆ f(i). Com-
bining this with the second stipulation of Definition 4, we obtain 〈A, f〉 |=E,L ϕ.
This shows, that (∗) remains true for ϕ.
If ϕ = ¬ψ or ϕ = ψ ∧ % then (∗) for ϕ may be derived from Definition 5 and
Definition 7 in the usual way.
This completes the induction, and we are done.
Now we prove the converse of Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. Assume, that the consequence relation |=L of L is weakly decidable.
Let X ⊆ FormE,I(L) be a finite subset of FormE,I(L) and let ϕ ∈ FormE,I(L).
Then
X |=E,L ϕ implies ϕ ∈ Ded(X).
Proof. Assume, ϕ 6∈ Ded(X); it is enough to show, that X 6|=E,L ϕ. Do do
so, we shall construct an 〈E , I〉-structure 〈A, f〉 such that 〈A, f〉 |=E,L X but
〈A, f〉 6|=E,L ϕ.
First we show, that X ∩ FormL is consistent (in the sense of usual first
order logic). Indeed, if X ∩ FormL would be inconsistent, then it would follow,
that Ded0 = FormL, consequently, we would have Ded(X) = FormE,I(L);
particularly we would have ϕ ∈ Ded(X). Thus, there exists a first order structure
A such that A |=L X ∩ FormL.
Now, for any i ∈ I, let f(i) = cli(ThL(A)). Clearly, 〈A, f〉 is an 〈E , I〉-
structure. Observe, that for any ψ ∈ FormE,I(L) we have 〈A, f〉 |=E,L ψ iff
ψ ∈ Ded(X). Particularly, 〈A, f〉 |=E,L X and 〈A, f〉 6|=E,L ϕ, as desired.
Now we are ready to prove the main result of the paper which is a more
detailed version of Theorem 1.
Theorem 5. Suppose the consequence relation |=L of L is weakly decidable. Let
X ⊆ FormE,I(L) be a finite subset of FormE,I(L) and let ϕ ∈ FormE,I(L).
Then we have
(1) X |=E,L ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Ded(X);
(2) |=E,L is weakly decidable, too.
Proof. Combining Theorems 3 and 4, (1) follows immediately. To prove (2) we
note, that according to (1), for any finite X ⊆ FormE,I(L) and ϕ ∈ FormE,I(L)
we have X |=E,L ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Ded(X). But, by Theorem 2 Ded(X) is decidable for
any decidable X (in addition, an algorithm deciding Ded(X) may be effectively
constructed from an algorithm deciding X).
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